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Abstract
Nine of the ten recessions since WWII have been preceded by relatively large and sudden
increases in the price of oil. In this paper, I use time series analysis to forecast GDP
growth using oil prices. I use the methodology from Hamilton (2009), and extend the
dataset through 2010. Impulse response functions are used to analyze the historical
performance of the model’s one-year-ahead forecasts. In April, 2011, the International
Monetary Fund changed its forecast of 2011 GDP growth in the U.S. from 3.0% to 2.8%
largely due to persistently high oil prices. My model suggests that the price increase in
2011Q1 will lead to growth of 2% in 2011. Furthermore, my model predicts that a 54%
increase in crude oil prices during the second quarter of 2011 will lead the U.S. into a
double dip recession
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1. Introduction
The last time you pulled up to a red light and made a right turn, you probably were not
thinking about oil shocks—but if not for the 1973 oil crisis, some states might still
require you to wait for a green light to turn right. When the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) instituted an embargo on oil to countries deemed to be proIsrael, the global oil supply fell 7.5% (Hamilton 2010). The effects of the 1973 Oil Crisis
were incredibly far reaching. The U.S., led by Richard Nixon at the time, set the goal of
reducing energy consumption by 25% (Forrester 1984). Congress passed a temporary
nation-wide speed limit of 55 miles per hour which lasted until 1987 (Frum 2010). The
State of Oregon banned the use of Christmas lights and some commercial lighting (Frum
2010). Major developed countries such as the UK, Germany, Switzerland, Norway and
Italy prohibited flying, boating or driving on Sundays and some countries including Italy
experimented with an even-odd scheme where only those with odd license plate numbers
could buy gasoline on odd numbered days (Frum 2010). Thousands of U.S. gas stations
were closed due to lack of supply, with many more deciding whether to ration the
gasoline or sell the supply as fast as possible to minimize arguments with angry
customers (Hamilton 2010). The hours of waiting in lines and the fear of the American
lifestyle being threatened by instability in the Middle East, had a strong effect on
Americans. In 1975, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Savings Act to establish a
strategic reserve of petroleum to better prepare for oil supply shocks (Zador 1983). The
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Act also required states to develop energy conservation plans1, and required legalization
of the gasoline-saving right turn on red.2
In April 2011, crude oil prices reached a two and a half year high because of
political turmoil in Libya.3 President Obama addressed the issue of oil prices in a March
11, 2011 news conference.4 He pointed out that though we use 7% less oil than we did in
2005, we are still very dependent on foreign oil, controlling 2% of the world’s oil but
using over 25%.5 The U.S. imports over 50% of the crude oil it uses6. Though none
comes directly from Libya, European countries import crude oil from Libya which is
shipped to the U.S., refined and then shipped back to Europe.7 On April 11, the
International Monetary Fund changed its forecast for 2011 growth in the U.S. from 3.0%
to 2.8%, largely due to oil price increases.8 On April 21, with prices still rising, the
Justice Department announced an investigation into fraud in the setting of gasoline
prices.9 There was no reason to suspect fraud, and the notion that the U.S. Government
could lower the short term price of oil is unrealistic.10 Nevertheless, with consumers
angry over rising costs, the government has found itself desperate to pursue anything
which would appease consumers.
1
An additional Federal Regulation in 1992 required legalization of right turns on red in order for a state to
receive funding for energy conservation plans. Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/6322.html
2
Analysis from Zador (1983) suggests that the adoption of right-turn laws increased right turn crashes by
18%.
3
Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-11/imf-cuts-2011-u-s-growth-forecast-on-oillackluster-pace-of-job-gains.html
4
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/11/news-conference-president
5
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/11/news-conference-president
6
Source: http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm
7
Source: http://money.msn.com/how-to-budget/article.aspx?post=df31d82d-ff74-4a56-9cdc-1302039b3a02
8
Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-11/imf-cuts-2011-u-s-growth-forecast-on-oillackluster-pace-of-job-gains.html
9
Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/21/us-usa-energy-fraud-idUSTRE73K5FS20110421
10
Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/obamas-gas-pricecharade/2011/04/22/AFJLFGQE_blog.html
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While oil prices are clearly important, frequently making front page news, there is
a large amount of disagreement in the literature about the effects of oil prices on the U.S.
GDP. The instances where oil prices rise significantly in a short period of time, called oil
shocks, are of particular interest. The purpose of this paper is to examine how past oil
shocks have impacted the economy and predict how the economy will fare in light of
recent oil prices. Using the Hamilton (2008) methodology of forecasting with time series
analysis, I use the impulse response functions from oil price shocks to predict the
response of real GDP. The paper proceeds as follows: In the literature review, I describe
how oil became an integral part of the economy, and how oil shocks and recessions have
coincided since WWII. I highlight the disagreements in the literature about the effect of
oil shocks on the economy and the asymmetry of price increases and decreases.
Extending Hamilton’s sample, I build a similar forecasting model to predict the impact of
oil prices on real GDP. I compare the one-year-ahead forecasts of the model for different
oil shocks, and estimate the path of GDP given the oil shock in the first quarter of 2011.

2. Literature Review
In this section, I review the literature on oil shocks. I examine the history of oil before
and after WWII, and then explain the theories of how oil prices impact the economy. I
examine the issue of exogeneity of oil shocks, and show the construction of the model I
use in the rest of the paper.

2.1 Oil Shocks
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An oil shock refers to any time that oil prices rise significantly in a short period of time.
The causes and consequences of oil shocks have been shown to have generally similar
effects on industrialized countries. Kilian (2007) found that across G7 countries, all of
which except Canada are net oil importers,11 oil price increases are generally followed by
a hit to real GDP in the second year after the shock. He also noted a spike in inflation
peaking three to four quarters after the oil price shock. There is a branch of literature that
studies the effects of oil shocks on inflation, but this paper focuses on the relationship
between oil prices and real U.S. GDP.
There is substantial disagreement in the literature over how much oil prices affect
the U.S. economy and through which mechanisms the effects are realized. Blanchard and
Gali (2007) argued that the economy today is better able to adapt than in the past, so
shocks have less effect now. The Blanchard and Gali argument made sense in light of the
significant price increases from 2002-2007, with no commensurate recession. Nordhaus
(2007) too argued that the effects were small for 2002-2007 because they were gradual.
Figure 1 shows that the energy intensity in the U.S. economy, measured the share of
energy purchases in total expenditures, has been cut in half since the 1970s (Blinder
2009). Edelstein and Kilian (2007) found a declining effect of energy price shocks on the
aggregate measures of consumption—in a sample from 1970-2006, a 1% increase in
energy prices was found to lead to a 0.30% decline in real consumption one year later for
the first half of the sample, but only 0.08% for the second half. Blanchard and Gali
(2007) attributed the lack of recession to the above reasons, in combination with an

11

The UK exported oil until 2006 when the country became a net importer. Source: U.S. Energy
Information Agency: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oiltrade.html
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automobile industry which had decreased in size since the previous shocks, and a Federal
Reserve that established credibility in keeping inflation low.
Unfortunately, the recession of 2007-2008 presented a challenge to the story that
the economy was now relatively immune to energy price socks. Although the energy
intensity had fallen significantly since the 1970s, Kilian (2009) notes it began increasing
again after 2000, as displayed in Figure 1.12 The energy intensity was 8% in 1970 and
steadily rose to a high of 13.7% in 1981. It declined to its low of 5.9% in 1999 but by
2007 the value was back up to 8.8% and Hamilton (2009) argues that this increasing
energy intensity amplified the effect of the oil price shock. He argues that with the earlier
increases people could afford to keep buying energy, but then by the end of 2007, they
could no longer afford to and a threshold was reached which set in motion the impending
collapse of the housing market and the financial crisis. Hamilton (2009) argues that there
would not have been a recession in 2007-2008 in the absence of oil price increases.
The Hamilton claim, however, does not belittle the housing bubble and the
collapse of the financial industry as the cause for the Great Recession. His argument is as
follows: Demand was rising globally from 2002-2007 and due to the supply increases in
2004-2006, the price effects of the increasing demand weren’t realized until the
production slowed in 2007-2008. Since the housing market had already been creating a
drag on the economy, the rapid oil prices tipped the economy into the housing crisis13 and
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The shaded areas on this graph correspond to recessions.
Hamilton (2009) notes the interaction between oil prices and housing: home prices in suburbs fell far
more in suburbs that require long commutes via automobile, than in neighborhoods closer to cities.
13
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financial meltdown. I now take a step back to examine how oil became such an integral
part of the U.S. economy that a respected economist could claim that oil prices caused the
largest economic recession since the Great Depression.

2.2 History of Oil before WWII
In 1859, Edwin Drake produced the first commercially available crude oil in the U.S.
(Hamilton 2010). A tax on alcohol added in 1862 made alcohol-derived illuminants too
expensive to produce. Consequently, alternative illuminants made with petroleum
became the norm. After the civil war, the oil industry expanded but still only accounted
for 0.4% of GNP in 1900.
In the early twentieth century, the use of petroleum evolved, and petroleum
products became more integrated into various parts of the economy. Though petroleum
based illuminants were largely replaced with electric lighting, oil became widely used for
commercial and industrial heating. Additionally, oil was used to power trains and, later
on, for motor vehicles.
After the Great Depression, the oil industry changed in two distinct ways: it was
more regulated, and it became largely controlled by Texas. With the discovery of the
enormous East Texas field, which started producing oil in 1930, Texas became a major
part of the oil industry. The state would produce 40% of the crude in the U.S. from 19351960 (Hamilton 2010). The Texas Railroad Commission (TRC), the state agency
governing petroleum use in Texas, initiated regulations which both mandated proper field
management and restricted supply to keep prices high. The TRC had a widespread
influence—in the post World War II era, global crude oil prices were quoted based on
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prices in the Gulf of Mexico. The TRC would keep nominal prices constant and raise
them in response to external supply disruptions.

2.3 Behavior of oil prices after WWII
From 1948-1972, the TRC would forecast demand for the upcoming month and set
production levels to meet the demand (Hamilton 2010). After 1973, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries became the major player in the world oil market,
changing production levels in response to fluctuations in demand.
Hamilton (2008) notes that nine of the ten U.S. recessions since WWII have
occurred after increases in oil prices. A recession is typically two consecutive quarters of
negative GDP growth, but the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has
flexibility in setting the dates. The NBER defines a recession as:
A significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting
more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment,
industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.14
Figure 2 displays the oil shocks.15 The following events are responsible for the large oil
shocks:
Korean War: Oil prices were frozen by order of the Office of Price Stabilization from
January 25, 1950 to February 13, 1953.
1956-1957 Suez Crisis: Israel, Britain and France invaded the Suez Canal, preventing
transportation of oil through the canal and movement of Iraqi oil transportation through

14
15

Source: http://www.nber.org/cycles.html
Shaded areas in this graph correspond to recessions.
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Syria. The global production fell by 10.1%, the largest percentage drop of any oil shock
(Hamilton 2010).
OPEC embargo: Syria and Egypt attacked Israel on October 6, 1973 and the U.S.
provided weapons and supplies to assist Israel. On October 17, the Arab members of
OPEC announced an embargo to pro-Israel countries. The overall decrease in global
production was 7.5% from September to November.
Iranian Revolution: There were large scale protests in Iran, including oil sector
employees. The result was a drop of 7% of world production from October 1978 to
January 1979. Saudi Arabia was able to increase production which made up for a third of
the lost production in Iran.
1980-1981 Iran-Iraq war. When Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, the lost
production from both countries caused a 7.2% drop in global production.
First Gulf War: When Iraq invaded Kuwait, production from both countries dropped.
The two countries accounted for 9% of world supply, and the disruption caused prices to
double. There were no long lines or rationing of oil in the U.S., because Saudi Arabia was
able to increase production to bring back levels back to the pre-war levels within a few
months.
The Iraq War beginning in 2003 and the instability in Venezuela in 2002 did not
coincide with subsequent recessions. This led Blanchard and Gali (2007) to believe that
the country had improved its ability to respond to oil shocks. In the following section, I
take a closer look at the mechanism through which oil shocks are believed to affect GDP.
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2.4 Mechanism of effects
Demand for oil is largely determined by income; as an economy grows, more oil is
needed to fuel growth. The natural log of oil consumption plotted against the log of real
GDP has a slope of 1.2 from 1949-1961 and 1.04 from 1961-1973 (Hamilton, 2009). This
slope is the income elasticity of demand, in other words if income increases by 1%, from
1949-1961, on average oil consumption increased by 1.2%16. The elasticity falls to 0.47
for the period from 1985-1997, which Hamilton (2009) attributes to either the “delayed
consequences of increased energy conservation following the 1970s oil shocks” or the
natural process of the income elasticity falling as a country gets more developed.
The price elasticity of demand, which measures how much demand will fall for a
1% increase in price, is also an important metric. Since individuals and firms are
relatively unable or unwilling to change consumption of oil, the price elasticity of
demand for oil is low. Hamilton (2009) estimates the short-run price elasticity of demand
for gasoline to be 0.21-0.34 from 1975-1980 but only 0.034-0.077 in 2001-2006,
reflecting an even greater lack of adjustment to price changes.
The energy intensity in the U.S. economy has been falling since the 1970s. With
an income elasticity below 1, when income increases oil, consumption increases by a
smaller percentage, so the energy intensity falls. However, with low short-run price
elasticity, when the price of oil goes up the demand falls by less than the price increase
and the energy intensity rises (Hamilton 2009).

16

These percentages are calculated as the difference in the natural log of consumption.
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One argument for the mechanism of supply disruptions affecting the economy is
the factor share argument. A firm’s production function Y can be expressed in terms of
labor (N), capital (K) and energy (E), with the following formula:
  , ,

.

If P is the nominal price, W is wages, Q is the price of energy, and r is the
nominal interest rate, profits are given by:






 .

Firms will use energy up to the point where marginal product of energy equals the
price of energy. The partial derivative of F with respect to energy is given by QE/PY.
Therefore, the elasticity of output for a change in energy use can be predicted by the
energy intensity.17 The factor share framework is useful for conceptualizing the
macroeconomic effects of oil price fluctuations on firms. However, based on a survey of
the literature, Hamilton (2008) asserts that
The key mechanism whereby oil shocks affect the economy is through a
disruption in spending by consumers and firms on other goods [and] if this
disruption fails to occur, the effects on the economy are indeed governed by the
factor share argument.

Edelstein and Kilian (2007) break down the effects of energy price changes on
consumption behavior into four components and test the contribution from each. The first
component measures the effect of a decrease in spending of discretionary income. Due to
the low price elasticity of demand for oil, consumers will continue to spend on oil when
17

This is a modified version of the factor share argument layed out in Hamilton (2008)
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prices rise and have less left over for other spending. This effect is bounded by the energy
intensity, because even if the elasticity of demand is zero, one still only needs to spend a
certain amount on energy. The second effect is the “uncertainty effect” (Edelstein and
Kilian 2007) of consumers putting off decisions about purchases of durable goods, which
may be difficult to reverse, until there is more certainty about oil prices. Hamilton (2003)
points out that a change in oil prices leads to hesitation in consumption:
How energy-efficient should your appliances, windows and insulation be?...When
energy prices and availability are as uncertain as they were in early 1974, it is
rational to postpone such commitments until better information is available.
The response to consumption of durable goods is five times larger than that predicted by
the energy share argument (Hamilton 2009). However, Edelstein and Kilian find no
evidence of the uncertainty effect directly. The third effect is the decrease in overall
spending which goes instead towards “precautionary saving” as consumers worry about
uncertain oil prices. The fourth effect is the “operating cost effect” which is the decrease
in spending on durable goods that require energy used as a compliment, such as
automobiles. Edelstein and Kilian (2007) also tested for indirect “allocative effects” due
to changing composition in the sectors of the economy. For example, if automobiles
become more costly to produce, industry specific capital and labor may be unused. They
were unable to find evidence for this reallocation effect, but are not surprised because of
the diminishing role of the U.S. automobile industry. Other studies, such as Lee and Ni
(2002) however, find that the reallocation amplifies the negative effect on the economy.
The ability to understand the relative contributions of each effect is critical for
extending the model into the future. For example, if the relative contribution from
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automobile spending is known, then it can be scaled by the size of the automobile
industry when applied to predicting future consequences. Edelstein and Kilian (2007)
find that a 1% increase in energy prices leads to a decrease of 0.15% in real consumption
one year later.

2.5 The Exogeneity of Oil Shocks Issue
If oil shocks and GDP growth are found to have a statistically significant relationship in
the subsequent periods, then there is a historical correlation between the sets of values. In
order to say that oil shocks actually cause the change in growth rate of GDP, it is
necessary to say that oil shocks are determined exogenously, that is, by external forces
outside of the model.
Due to the Texas Railroad Commission’s setting of prices to meet forecasted
demand, Hamilton (2003) argues that only supply disruptions changed price from 1948 to
1972. Since these supply disruptions are caused by political activity in the Middle East,
Hamilton argues that oil prices were exogenous during this period. Hamilton (2003) notes
that the argument about exogeneity from 1948-1972 cannot be made about post 1973 data
when global forces of supply and demand determine prices.
As long as the political events in the Middle East that cause supply shocks are not
determined by the business cycle fluctuations in the U.S., the correlation should be
interpreted as causal (Hamilton 2010). Hamilton (1983) performs a test for Granger
Causality of oil prices on GDP. Since there may still be a third variable causing both the
oil prices and the recessions, Hamilton (1983) tests if lagged values of six macro
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aggregate variables in a Sims VAR system Granger cause oil prices. He argues that if
Granger Causality is shown and no other macro variables can be proven to predict oil
price changes, then there is a strong case for causality. The six variables tested were real
GNP, unemployment rate, U.S. prices, U.S. wages, inflation, and import prices. The only
statistically significant variable was import prices, but the portion of oil prices driving
GDP could not be predicted by oil prices. Since there is no evidence of an omitted
variable driving both oil prices and GDP, the causal view is supported. Kilian (2009)
disagrees, arguing that real global demand may be driving both U.S. business cycle
dynamics and oil prices, violating the ceteris paribus condition, . Kilian (2009) also
cautions against the causal interpretation of Hamilton’s model in the case of 2007-2008
because the price changes were gradual from 2002-2007 and Hamilton’s model captures
the effect on average of the sudden shocks.

2.6 Constructing the model
Using the Hamilton (1983) finding that none of the macroeconomic variables in the Sims
system Granger cause oil prices, the functional form of the equation can use simply
lagged values of change in GDP and change in oil prices. The “feedback-free reducedform equation” (Hamilton 1983) is
yt= a0 + a1yt-1 + a2yt-2 + a3yt-3 + a4yt-4
(1)
+ b1ot-1 + b2ot-2 + b3ot-3 + b4ot-4 + ut

2.7 Asymmetry
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Hooker (1996) argues that after 1973, oil price changes no longer Granger cause GDP
growth, even when only price increases are used. Mork (1989) ran Hamilton’s equation
with different coefficients for price increases and price decreases, with the former but not
the latter showing statistical significance. Hooker, however, using a post-1973 sample
found a Granger test p-value of 0.42 leading to rejection of Granger Causality for oil
price increases. The Hooker article, called “What happened to the oil pricemacroeconomy relationship?” was received for publication with the Journal of Monetary
Economics in March of 1996. In April of 1996, the final version of James Hamilton’s
article was received for publication. Hamilton’s title was “This is what happened to the
oil price-macroeconomy relationship”. In only 5 pages, compared with Hooker’s 18,
Hamilton refuted Hooker’s claim and suggested a new form of asymmetry to solve the
discrepancy. Hamilton plotted the change in nominal oil prices over time and saw that
increases often follow even larger decreases. He proposed instead using the percent
increase over the one year high, since these increases are more likely to affect firms and
consumers decisions. He calls this value the “net oil price increase,” and if the value in
period t is not a new one year high, the series is said to be zero. An F-test on the null
hypothesis that none of the lagged oil values changed after 1973 using the net oil price
increase, and the F-statistic was 1.71 leading to failure to reject the null hypothesis.
Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995) used a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model of oil price changes on GDP. The theoretical
backing for expecting conditional heteroskedasticity is that the shocks will matter more
when prices have been steady than when they have been volatile. When recent prices are
volatile an increase is often seen as correcting a previous decrease, but if prices are
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steady, the increase may be taken more seriously by consumers and firms. The model
essentially divides the oil shock by the recent volatility.
There was clearly some sort of asymmetry, but the exact nature was unclear.
Hamilton (2003) used a flexible approach to determine the correct nonlinear specification
to explain the asymmetry. He found strong evidence supporting the method of Lee, Ni
and Ratti (1995). He also found strong evidence for a method which uses “net oil price
increase” as in Hamilton (1996) but instead with only values that exceed the previous
three-year high. An instrumental variables approach that isolated the five major military
conflicts in the Middle East performed very similarly to the “net oil price increase” model
because taking the three-year high filters out almost everything except these events. The
number of non-zero observations in the 1947Q1-2010Q4 sample drops from 143 to 39.
The asymmetry remains a disputed issue in the literature. Edelstein and Kilian
(2007) found no evidence of asymmetry in response of consumer spending, aggregrate
unemployment rate, or consumer expectations. Hamilton (2008) believes that the
significant oil price decreases in 1985-1986 did not cause the subsequent economic
expansion. Edelstein and Kilian (2007) found symmetrical consumer behavior in
response to the 1979 oil shock and the 1986 oil price reductions.

3. Methodology
3.1 Data

18

The dataset consist of real GDP and crude oil prices from the first quarter of 1947 to the
fourth quarter of 2010. My data for Gross Domestic Product used was in real values,
using 2005 as the base year.18 The measure of oil prices used was the crude oil Producer
Price Index (PPI) for domestically produced oil, plotted in Figure 3. The monthly values
are averages of what oil refiners pay for crude oil produced domestically during that
month. Since the U.S. imports 51% of the crude oil and refined petroleum products it
uses19, and prices are set by forces of global supply and demand, the PPI for domestic
crude oil is still an appropriate measure to use. There are many different measures of oil
prices and the choice can have a profound impact on results. For example, Blanchard and
Gali (2007) predict that the economic growth in 1980-81 would have been worse if oil
prices had not risen. Hamilton (2008) points out that their measure of oil prices was the
price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil which fell during that period, while oil prices
increased according to all other measures. The crude oil PPI is a nominal value, so
inflation is not taken into account. Since inflation and GDP growth are related through
related macroeconomic factors, including inflation weakens the case for oil shocks being
exogenous. The crude oil PPI values are recorded monthly, so I converted it to a quarterly
dataset by taking the end values of each quarter. For example, the first quarter value for
2011 is the crude oil PPI for March. Oil shocks are measured as in Hamilton (2008). Still
using the monthly data, the previous three year high at each quarter is recorded. Then, if
the value in quarter t is greater than the three year high, the oil shock is the percentage
increase from the previous three-year high. This value will hereafter be referred to as the
net oil price increase. The oil shock is said to be zero if no new three-year high is reached
18
19

Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/106
Source: http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm
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during the period. This method is used to focus on the major oil shocks. The drawback of
using this methodology is that there are only 39 quarters in which an oil shock occurs, so
the sample size is small. The summary statistics for the 39 shocks are shown in Table 1.
All of the net oil price increases are shown in the Appendix.

3.2 Stationarity
In order to make a dependable forecast using time series data, it is often better to look at
changes rather than levels. If the levels have a trend, then the values before and after a
given time will have a different joint distribution that depends on the time.20 Such a time
series is said to be nonstationary, and forecasts will be skewed. A variable must be
stationary for time series analysis and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to
test for stationary. I conducted ADF tests on both real GDP and crude oil PPI, finding
both to be nonstationary. However, tests on the difference in natural log of real GDP and
net oil price increase showed both to be stationary with p-values <0.0000121. The
variables are now considered to be integrated of order one, or I(1).22

3.3 Cointegration
Even though the two variables y and o are stationary when integrated of order one, there
is still a chance that the variables share a common trend. If y – βo is stationary, when β is
some coefficient, then y and o are cointegrated. I used the EG-ADF test23 for
cointegration. First I regressed y on o and calculated the residuals. Then I ran an ADF test
20

Keil’s 2008 Lecture Notes
Resuts of test are shown in Appendix
22
Keil’s 2008 Lecture Notes
23
Stock and Watson Textbook, Chapter 16
21
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on the residuals. The p value of the test statistic for the EG-ADF test was <0.00001,
leading to rejection of the null hypothesis of cointegration.24 Intuitively, this result makes
sense because it would be surprising to find that GDP growth at time t had a common
trend with the same period’s net oil price increase which as is largely determined by
political instability in the Middle East.

3.4 Lag Selection
In the regressions I am essentially using the lagged values of real GDP growth and net oil
price increase to forecast real GDP growth. The values of real GDP growth are calculated
as the difference in natural log between real GDP in period t and t-1, and will hereafter be
referred to as GDP growth. Equation 1 shows the form of the regression used by
Hamilton (2008).
yt= a0 + a1yt-1 + a2yt-2 + a3yt-3 + a4yt-4
(1)
+ b1ot-1 + b2ot-2 + b3ot-3 + b4ot-4 + ut
Where y is GDP growth, and o is the net oil price increase. The dependent variable is
GDP growth in quarter t, and the eight explanatory variables are the values of GDP
growth in the previous four periods and the net oil price increase in the previous four
periods. To decide the optimal number of lagged values to use, I used the BayesSchwartz Information Criterion (BIC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).25 If
too few lags are used, an important explanatory variable may be left out, and if too many
are used then unnecessary explanatory variables will increase the inaccuracy of the
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Resuts of test are shown in Appendix
Keil’s 2008 Lecture Notes
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forecast. Both of these information criteria give information that balance these factors.
Both the BIC and the AIC suggest a lag length of four.26 The results of the regression,
shown in Figure 3, show that the fourth lag of oil prices is significant at the 5% level for
the full sample. Using four lags is consistent with the equation used by Hamilton (2008).

3.5 Standard Errors
I use Newey-West Standard Errors for the regressions. A White noise Q test tests the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation. Both net oil price increase and GDP growth have a
Portmanteau (Q) statistic p-value of <0.00001, leading to a rejection of the null. Since
there is serial correlation and no reason to assume homoskedasticity, I use Newey West
errors which are consistent for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.

3.6 Breaks in the Data
Hamilton found that the relationship from 1948-1972 was a poor predictor of the effects
from the price increases of 1973-1974, because the price increases were roughly three
times larger than the largest during the 1948-1972 sample. The results for the entire
sample consequently show much smaller coefficients than the second sample. Hamilton
(1983) hypothesizes that “changes in expected inflation, the response of monetary policy
to oil shocks, or the regime in which oil prices are determined” could create the structural
break. I conducted a Chow test for a structural break starting in 1973Q1 and with a p
value of 0.0000 rejected the null hypothesis of no break.

26

Resuts of test are shown in Appendix
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4. Results
4.1 Regression
As in Hamilton, I estimate the regression beginning in 1949Q2, because during 1947 and
1948 the post war transition to automobile usage led to an 80% increase in the price of
crude oil, but this is not the type of oil price variation we are interested in examining.27
Figure 4 shows the results of the regression. Column 1 is from the full sample from
1949Q2-2010Q4. Column 2 shows the same results for the early sample period from
1949Q2-1972Q4, the point at which Hamilton (1983) finds a structural break. I ran a
Chow test for a structural break at 1973Q1. With the null hypothesis of no break, I found
an F-stat of 8.49 with a p value of 0.0000 leading to rejection of the null. Column 3
shows the results for the late sample period from 1973Q1-2010Q4. The form of the
regression from column 1 is displayed in equation 2 with Newey-West standard errors in
brackets.
yt= 0.825 + 0.25yt-1 + 0.12yt-2 – 0.10yt-3 – 0.09yt-4
(0.10) (0.06)
(0.07)
(0.06) (0.07)
– 0.02ot-1 – 0.02ot-2 – 0.02ot-3 – 0.02ot-4
(0.01) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)

The R-squared is 0.23 meaning that 23% of the variation in GDP growth is
explained by the model. When the four lagged values of GDP growth are taken out, the
model with only four lagged values of net oil price increase has an R-squared of 0.14.
The Results with only the net oil price increase are shown in columns 4-6 of Figure 4.

27

Hamilton (2010)
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4.2 Granger Causality
The Granger Causality test is applied to determine if a variable’s lagged values have
predictive power of another variable. The name “Granger causality” is a misnomer in the
sense that the test does not determine if the dependent variable causes the independent
variable. Stock and Watson note that a more appropriate name would be “Granger
predictability” 28 because though it may be useful in forecasting, additional assumptions
need to be made in order to make a causal interpretation. Namely, the assumption of
exogeneity needs to be satisfied. Since the net oil price increase is considered fairly
exogenous, the results of the Granger Causality test can be interpreted roughly as a test of
one variable causing the other.
In the Granger Causality test, the null hypothesis of the F-test is that all four
lagged values of net oil price increase are insignificant explanatory variables when
regressed on GDP growth. The F-test p-value is 0.0001 leading to rejection of the null.
This establishes that net oil price increase Granger causes GDP growth.
To test whether GDP growth Granger causes net oil price increase, I regressed
GDP growth on net oil price increase. The null hypothesis that all four lagged values of
GDP growth are insignificant explanatory variables has an F-Test p-value of 0.55, so the
null cannot be rejected. Hence, GDP growth does not Granger cause net oil price
increase.29

4.3 Impulse Response Functions

28
29

Stock and Watson Textbook, Chapter 15
The results of both Granger Causality tests can be found in the Appendix Sections 6 and 7
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Table 1. Values of Net Oil Price Increase in During Oil Shocks
Date
Net Oil Price Increase
1974q1
52.8%
1979q1

50.7%

1980q1

34.4%

1990q1
2007q1

32.6%
31.8%

1981q1

24.3%

2008q3

23.5%

A first step for interpreting the above regression is to look at the impulse response
function for a one standard deviation net oil price increase (Kilian 2009). The standard
Deviation of net oil price increase is 13.86. For a 13.86% increase in oil prices, the model
predicts a 1.1% decrease in GDP four quarters later. The actual values of net oil price
increase during oil shocks are far higher, See Table 1.30 Since we care most about the
large values, consider that roughly 2 standard deviation net oil price increase of 25%
yields a 2.0% drop in GDP four quarters later.
Take for example the largest oil shock in the dataset which resulted from the
OPEC Embargo in October of 1973. The Crude Oil PPI increased from 19.9 to 24.3 from
December 1973 to January 1974. In March the figure was 27.5. In my dataset this
translates to a net oil price increase in 1974Q1 of 52.8%. Figure 4 shows what the model
from 1949Q1-2010Q4 would predict for the one-year-ahead forecast, compared with the
actual result. Figures 5-9 show the same results for the other major oil shocks. In each
graph, the forecast

30

All values are shown in the Appendix.
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Figure 4. Regression of Net Oil Price Increase and GDP Growth on GDP Growth
(1)
yt
(1949Q22010Q4)

(2)
yt
(1949Q21972Q4)

(3)
(1)
(2)
(3)
yt
yt
yt
yt
(1973Q1- (1949Q2- (1949Q2- (1973Q120104)
20104)
2010Q4) 1972Q4)

ot-1

0.250***
(0.0641)
0.118
(0.0714)
-0.0972
(0.0628)
-0.0879
(0.0714)
-0.0207**

0.149**
(0.0726)
0.135
(0.0944)
-0.127*
(0.0721)
-0.169*
(0.0976)
-0.148***

0.221**
(0.0856)
0.0913
(0.0945)
-0.0505
(0.0926)
0.0141
(0.109)
-0.0185*

ot-2

(0.00969)
-0.0192**

(0.0276)
-0.103**

(0.00952)
-0.0175**

ot-3

(0.00765)
-0.0186***

(0.0444)
-0.248***

ot-4

(0.00704)
-0.0202**

(0.0430)
-0.155

(0.00795)
0.825***
(0.0979)

(0.118)
1.251***
(0.157)

VARIABLES

yt-1
yt-2
yt-3
yt-4

Constant

Observations
R2
Root MSE

247
0.230
0.881

-0.024**

0.127***
(0.0394)
0.117***
(0.0437)
0.291***
(0.0290)
-0.198*

(0.0093)
0.026***
(0.00760) (0.0074)
-0.0142**
0.026***
(0.00665) (0.0074)
-0.0166**
0.026***
(0.00828) (0.0092) (0.106)
0.706*** 1.02*** 1.277***
(0.115)
(0.079)
(0.133)

95
152
247
0.358
0.248
0.139
0.979
0.746
.924
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.0213**
(0.00922)
0.0235***
(0.00754)
0.0203***
(0.00680)
-0.0223**
(0.00913)
0.963***
(0.0773)

95
0.270
1.02

152
0.193
.763

is given along with dotted lines for the 95% confidence interval.31
How accurate is the model at forecasting GDP? The R2 of 0.24 shows the
limitations of the model. If the oil shocks are determined exogenously, it provides an
31

Calculated as the projection +/- 1.96 Newey-West Standard Errors.
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Figure 5. Regression of Net Oil Price Increase and GDP Growth on GDP Growth at
the Time of Each Oil Shock
(1)
VARIABLES
yt
(1949Q21974Q1)
yt-1
yt-2
yt-3
yt-4
ot-1
ot-2
ot-3
ot-4
Constant

Observations

(2)
yt
(1949Q21979Q1)

(3)
yt
(1949Q21980Q1)

(4)
yt
(1949Q21990Q1)

(5)
yt
(1949Q21981Q1)

(6)
yt
(1949Q22008Q2)

0.219** 0.215***
(0.0861)
(0.0759)
0.136
0.0813
(0.108)
(0.0958)
-0.0886
-0.0901
(0.0858)
(0.0823)
-0.157
-0.184**
(0.0986)
(0.0905)
-0.0413
-0.00852
(0.0303) (0.00891)
0.0725***
0.0423***
(0.0151) (0.00827)
-0.0508 -0.0319**

0.224***
(0.0775)
0.0892
(0.0928)
-0.0986
(0.0799)
-0.165*
(0.0873)
-0.00782
(0.00621)
-0.0259*

0.228***
(0.0695)
0.0969
(0.0786)
-0.103
(0.0731)
-0.122
(0.0813)
-0.0256*
(0.0144)
-0.0210*

0.244***
(0.0771)
0.0726
(0.0889)
-0.136*
(0.0755)
-0.129
(0.0913)
-0.0211
(0.0132)
-0.0242**

0.234***
(0.0637)
0.113
(0.0727)
-0.0978
(0.0643)
-0.0994
(0.0735)
-0.0167*
(0.00947)
-0.0168**

(0.0136)
(0.0112)
(0.0121)
-0.0208** -0.0168*
0.0246***
(0.0574)
(0.0140) (0.00817) (0.00988) (0.00922)
-0.0273**
-0.0727**
0.0469*** 0.0342*** 0.0292***
(0.0365)
(0.0108)
(0.0109)
(0.0107)
(0.0114)
1.027*** 1.096*** 1.047*** 0.969*** 1.045***
(0.152)
(0.149)
(0.153)
(0.126)
(0.154)

(0.00741)
-0.0189**

100
0.253

120
124
164
0.242
0.223
0.214
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

128
0.209

(0.00747)
-0.0219**
(0.00845)
0.863***
(0.102)
237
0.201

estimate, all else equal, for the path of GDP growth. And since the fourth lagged value of
net oil price increase is significant at the one percent level, the one-year-ahead forecasts
could be useful. Figure 5 shows the forecasts of the model up to the time of each oil
shock. Whereas Figures 6-11 show the impulse response using the model using the
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information known in 2011, Figures 12-17 show the impulse response functions using the
information known at time t. Table 2 compares the two sets.

Figure 6. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shock
of 1974Q1
2 Percent
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Figure 7. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shock
of 1979Q1
2 Percent
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Figure 8. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shock
of 1980Q1
2 Percent
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Figure 9. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shock
of 1990Q4
2 Percent
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Figure 10. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to
Consecutive Oil Shocks of 1981Q1 and Q2
2 Percent
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Figure 11. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to
Consecutive Oil Shocks of 2008Q2 and Q3
2 Percent
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Figure 12. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil
Shock of 1974Q1 with model as of 1974
10 Percent
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Figure 13. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil
Shock of 1979Q1 with model as of 1979
2 Percent
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Figure 14. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil
Shock of 1980Q1 with model as of 1980
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Figure 15. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil
Shock of 1990Q1 with model as of 1990Q1
2 Percent
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Figure 16. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to
Consecutive Oil Shocks of 1981Q1 and 1981Q2 with model as of 1981Q1
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Figure 17. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to
Consecutive Oil Shocks of 1981Q1 and 1981Q2 with model as of 1981Q1
2 Percent
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Table 2. One-Year-Ahead Forecasts of Past Oil Shocks: Comparison of
Performance of the Equation Known in 2011 with the Model known at time of Oil
Shock
Date of
Shocks

Size
of
Shoc
k

OneYear
Ahead
Result

One-Year
Ahead
Forecast
With Model
from
1949Q22010Q4
(Cumulative
Percentage
Change in
real GDP)

Forecast
Error
(Percentage
Points)

1974 Q1

52.7
%
50.7
%
34.4
%
24.3
%
7.1%
14.8
%
20.6
%
23.4
%

-2.36%

-4.13%

1.4%

1979 Q1
1980 Q1
1981 Q1
1981 Q2
1990 Q4
2008 Q2
2008 Q3

Forecast
Error
(Percentag
e Points)

1.8

One-Year
Ahead
Forecast
With Model
from
1949Q2Time of
Shock
(Cumulative
Percentage
Change in
real GDP)
-4.87%

-4.0%

5.4

-6.6%

8.0

1.6%

-2.7%

4.3

-3.2%

4.8

-2.5%

-2.3%

0.2

-2.6

0.1

1.0%

-1.2%

2.2

-1.4%

2.4

4.2%

-3.0%

1.2

-2.8%

1.4

2.5

2.5

3.2

1.4

1.6

Average
Average
Excluding
1979 and
1980
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5. Discussion
5.1 Extension to 2011 Oil Shock
On April 11, 2011 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lowered its forecast for 2011
U.S. nominal GDP growth from 3.0% to 2.8%, largely due to the increasing price of oil.32
The PPI for December 2010 (the fourth quarter value in my sample) is 242.0, and the
value increases 17% to 283.5 in March 2011 (the third quarter value in my sample).
Figure 18 shows the cumulative change in real GDP following a 17% net oil price
increase. Using the model with Hamilton’s definition of an oil shock, there will be no
shock until prices reach 384.3, the July 2008 value. However, this definition was created
so that only large oil shocks are examined. Since prices dropped so drastically after July
2008, the March 2011 value is only a two and a half year high. I include the shock
nonetheless. Three quarters after the shock represents the end of 2011. All else equal,
given that the oil price rose 17% from 2010Q4 to 2011Q1, we expect to see real GDP
lower by almost a percent. The 95% confidence interval runs from -0.26% to -2.4%. The
IMF projected decline of expected GDP growth, therefore, is outside the upper bound of
the predicted effect based on my model. If there is a subsequent 10% spike in the second
quarter, the model predicts a 1.3% decline corresponding to 1.7% GDP growth for 2011.

32

Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-11/imf-cuts-2011-u-s-growth-forecast-on-oillackluster-pace-of-job-gains.html
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Figure 18. Forecasted Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shocks of
2011Q1
2 Percent
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Figure 19. Forecasted Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shocks of
2011Q1 Followed by Hypothetical 10% Shock in 2011Q2
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Retail gas prices have continued to rise up to the publication date. Since the U.S.
is coming out of a recession it is reasonable to expect demand to continue to rise, and the
falling dollar makes it even more probable that prices will continue to rise for
Americans.33 If crude oil PPI rises 54% this quarter, the model predicts growth will
decline by 3 percentage points, see Figure 20. Using the IMF forecast of 3% as of
2011Q1, this translates to zero growth. Since the fourth lag of the second shock would
take effect in the first quarter of 2012, the model would predict a second quarter with
negative growth, constituting a recession.

Figure 20. Forecasted Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shocks of
2011Q1 Followed by Hypothetical 57% Shock in 2011Q2
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Source: http://money.msn.com/how-to-budget/article.aspx?post=df31d82d-ff74-4a56-9cdc1302039b3a02
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5.2 Limitations of the Methods
There are several significant limitations to the methods used in this paper. First,
there are only five major oil exogenous shocks in the sample and the net oil price increase
above the three year high only has 39 non-zero observations. There may be important
variables omitted such as energy intensity (Kilian 2008) and wage flexibility (Blinder
2009). The end of an expansionary period may cause higher demand for oil, raising
prices. Then the oil prices and output decline are simultaneous, but both caused by a third
factor. (Hamilton 2008). One of those potential factors that Kilian (2008) proposes is
global real activity. This variable is of particular interest for the debate about the causes
of the 1973-4 oil shock. Hamilton (2003) argues that the price increases were mostly
driven by the calculated political decisions of the Arab members of OPEC. Kilian (2008),
however, constructs a measure of global real demand, based on shipping rates of cargo
and claims that the price increases had to do in large part with an economic calculation.34

6. Conclusion
In this paper I have looked at the one-year-ahead forecasts of GDP growth based on oil
shocks. For the sample period 1949Q2-2010Q4, four previous quarter’s values of the net
oil price increases explain 14% of the variation in GDP growth during time t.
Considering that many factors influence GDP growth, this value is economically
34

Hamilton’s response comes in three parts. First the price of a barrel of oil went from $3.01 to $11.65
from October to January as OPEC instituted the embargo. It is unlikely that the calculation would lead to
such a large price increase at exactly that time. Second, it is unlikely that the Arab members of OPEC and
nonArab members reached different calculations of demand. And lastly, the embargo was fueled largely by
Egypt and Syria who were not oil producing nations, but rather just the most vehemently anti-Israel
nations.
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significant. The forecast error of the model was 8 percentage points and 4.8 percentage
points for 1979 and 1980 respectively. For the other three shocks, the model was off by
1.6 percentage points on average. What gives the results strength is that the fourth lag is
significant at the 5% level for all specifications, and the standard errors are relatively
small as most of the lagged variables are significant. Therefore, the model gives a
prediction of, all else equal, what the likely path of GDP growth will be.
The results in this paper have significant implications for monetary policy makers.
In 2008Q1, the Federal Reserve rapidly decreased interest rates, concerned about a
weakening economy. Frankel (2008) argues that low real interest rates are correlated with
high real commodity prices. He asserts that when real interest rates are low, the
opportunity cost of keeping large inventories of commodities goes down. The increased
demand will then cause the price to be artificially high until the market realizes that the
commodities are overvalued. Hamilton (2009) points out that Fed Chairman Ben
Bernanke was focused on the longer term picture that the U.S. economy needed demand
stimulated, and that commodity prices would decline once global demand slowed.
However, if Frankel (2008) is right, than the monetary policy reaction increased the oil
prices. My model then, predicts that high oil prices contributed to the severity of the
recession in the subsequent four quarters. Hamilton (2009) and Frankel (2008) note that
the Federal Reserve then may have decreased the severity of the recession, had it more
strongly considered the effects of short term oil price increases. If the economy goes into
another recession as my model predicts following a 54% net oil price increase in 2011Q2,
monetary policymakers may pay more attention to controlling oil prices this time around.
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Appendix
1.Oil Shocks from 1949-2010 with the Major Oil Shocks Highlighted
Quarter

Net Oil Price Increase

1948-I
1953-I
1956-I
1957-I
1966-I
1967-I
1968-I
1969-I
1970-I
1971-I
1973-I
1974-I
1974-IV
1975-I
1976-I
1977-I
1978-I
1979-I
1980-I
1981-I
1981-II
1989-I
1990-I
1990-IV
1996-I
1999-I
2000-I
2000-II
2000-III
2000-IV
2004-I
2004-IV
2005-I
2005-IV
2006-III

5.5
10.5
0.8
9.4
0.7
0.7
0.7
5.1
6.2
1.3
27.6
52.8
1.0
16.6
0.8
8.9
8.4
50.7
34.4
24.3
7.1
3.5
32.6
14.8
22.0
0.1
11.0
10.3
3.3
8.5
14.3
8.8
37.4
5.4
9.3
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2007-I
2008-II
2008-III
2011-1

31.8
20.6
23.4
17.1

2.Oil shock Summary Statistics
Observations: 39
Mean: 13.6
Standard Deviation: 13.9
Min: 0.1
Max: 52.8

3.Variable Definition
GDP Growth: difference in natural log of GDP between t and t1 (referred to in paper as GDP growth)
Net Oil Price Increase: Percentage increase above previous
three year high. If no new three year high is set, value is zero.
Crude oil PPI: Quarter end value of crude oil PPI
Natural log of real GDP: Natural log of real GDP in 2005
years at time t
4. Results of EG-ADF test for cointegration between GDP Growth and Net Oil Price
Increase
Test Statistic for test of Cointegration: -7.8

Mackinnon approximate p-value for Z(t):
0.0000

5. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results for natural log of real GDP and GDP
growth
Test Statistic for Natural log of GDP: -1.1
Test Statistic for Net Oil Price Increase: 10.8

Mackinnon approximate p-value for Z(t): 0.72
Mackinnon approximate p-value for Z(t):
0.0000
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6. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results for crude oil PPI and the net oil price
increase
Test Statistic for Crude Oil PPI: -2.6
Test Statistic for Net Oil Price Increase: 15.8

Mackinnon approximate p-value for Z(t): 0.09
Mackinnon approximate p-value for Z(t):
0.0000

7. Lag Selection Test Leading to Selection of 4 Lags
Lag Length
2
3
4
5

AIC
676.69
668.94
661.51
660.2077

BIC
694.38
693.68
693.28
698.9877

8. Granger Causality Test for Null Hypothesis that net oil price increase does not
cause GDP Growth
F-Statistic: 8.03
Prob > F: 0.0001

9. Granger Causality Test for Null Hypothesis that GDP Growth does not cause Net
Oil Price Increase
F-Statistic: 1.60
Prob > F: 0.55
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